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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE
STATEMENT OF FACTS CONTAINS
FACTUAL ASSERTIONS.

CASE AND
ERRONEOUS

The appellee does not challenge the appellant, Harrington
Trucking's, statement of the case or statement of facts in her
brief.

However, appellee proffers her own statement of the

case and statement of the facts which contains substantial and
relevant erroneous assertions.

What follows is Harrington

Trucking's response and correction of appellee's erroneous
factual assertions.
1.
"that at

On pages 3 and 4 of her brief, appellee states that
the September

18, 1998,

[sic] hearing

on those

matters, Harrington acknowledged that it had not filed an
answer."

This assertion is not supported by the record.

The

September 18, 1998 hearing contains no reference by any party,
including counsel for Harrington Trucking, to the answer filed
on April 7, 1998. (R. 294, pp. 1-30.) Therefore, counsel for

1

Harrington Trucking did not '"acknowledge" that it had failed
to file an answer.
2.

On page 4 of her brief, appellee asserts that

"Harrington conducted no formal discovery in this case."
Again, Harrington's statement is directly controverted by the
record

in

this

case.

Attached

to

Harrington's

reply

memorandum in support of its motion to set aside default
judgment or declaration of common law marriage, Harrington
Trucking attached several exhibits which included subpoenas it
had issued as well as letters in an attempt to conduct
informal discovery through appellee's counsel.

(R. 160-235.)

Therefore, the record clearly shows that Harrington Trucking
conducted both formal and informal discovery in an attempt to
resolve this matter despite appellee's assertions to the
contrary.

(Id.)

3. Nowhere in appellee's statement of the case does she
mention that Harrington Trucking's motion to set aside the
default judgment was initially granted by Commissioner Arnett
who was familiar with the case. The same day the Commissioner
2

granted Harrington Trucking's motion to set aside the default
judgment, Judge Maughan, who was sitting on the case for the
first

time,

overruled

the

Commissioner's

report

and

recommendation. Judge Maughan simply did not have the time to
become familiar with the facts of the case in order to make a
proper ruling,
4.

On page 6 of appellee's brief at paragraph 4,

appellee asserts that uno answer controverting the allegations
of [appellee's] petition was ever filed."

This statement of

"fact" is the main issue in this case was before this Court
and therefore cannot be a fact.

It is for this Court to

decide whether or not any answer was filed on April 7, 1998
which precluded the court from entering a default judgment in
this matter.
5.
appellee

On pages 6 and 7 of appellee's brief at paragraph 9,
fails

to

quote

the

entire

text

of

Harrington

Trucking's answer filed on April 7, 1998. The entire text of
the answer is as follows:

3

COMES NOW Harrington Trucking and
objects to the petition for judicial
declaration of common law marriage filed in
this matter by Janet Robins Mitchell.
The basis for this objection is found
in the motion to intervene and the
accompanying memoranda filed by movant
Harrington Trucking and upon the basis that
the facts and affidavits submitted by
petitioner are insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of Utah Code Annot. § 31-14.5.
(R. 55-57.)
quoted by
6.

(Emphasis added.

Underlined portions were not

appellee.)
On page

7 of appellee's brief

at paragraph 10,

appellee asserts that "neither the intervention memorandum nor
the

objection

petition."
55-90.)

contest

any

allegation

of

[appellee's]

Again, this is not what the record reflects.

(R.

The objection was in the form of a general denial as

specifically allowed under Rule 8 (b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Harrington Trucking objected to all of

appellee's allegations in her petition.
7.

(Id.)

On page 7, paragraph 12, appellee's counsel argues

that he was unaware of any answer being
4

on file at the

September

18, 1998 hearing

and therefore

an answer was

necessary in order to put him on notice of what claims would
be contested by Harrington Trucking.

However, appellee's

counsel's ignorance of the general objection filed on April
17, 1998 is irrelevant to this case. The answer containing a
general objection was on file. Harrington Trucking challenged
all of the allegations in appellee's petition on April 7,
1998.

(R. 55-57.)

Even if appellee's counsel did not know

about the answer, an answer was on file. That is all that is
required under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
8
appellee

On page 9 of appellee's brief at paragraph 23,
asserts

that

"even

though

earlier

dates

were

available, Harrington Trucking scheduled its motion to set
aside for hearing on December 16, 1998."

This statement of

fact is misleading because the record reflects Harrington
Trucking's counsel did every thing in his power to expedite a
hearing date on this issue.

The records states as follows:

I'd like to back up a little bit and
talk about what happened when we filed our
motion to set aside. I personally brought
5

that motion here to the court.
I
personally filed it with the clerk.
I
personally took copies and brought them to
Judge Stirba. Judge Stirba, at that time,
had already left due to her incapacity. I
talked to her clerk. Her clerk informed me
that it was being sent down to Commissioner
Arnett. I said, Why, you know, shouldn't
this be heard before a Judge? She said,
No, I believe this should go down to
Commissioner Arnett. He has the file, I
don't have it anymore, you can't give me
anything.
I walked to Commissioner Arnett's
office.
I filed a courtesy copy with
Commissioner Arnett of the motion to set
aside default. I looked at his calendar.
Initially, there was a date on December
4th of this year, but that was the first
one.
So, again, that's after November
th
12 .
However, there was scheduling
difficulty and I had to click it back to
December 16th. But, again, I did it as
soon as I could because I realized that we
needed to get this resolved as soon as
possible. I was not - and I can say this
based on my own personal knowledge of what
I actually did. I did it as quickly as I
could.
(R. 294, pp. 19-20.)
9.

On

page

10,

paragraph

25,

appellee

states,

"Harrington does not argue that the lower court's finding of

6

prejudice to [appellee] was in error."

Although technically

true, the statement is misleading because it presupposes that
Harrington Trucking had a duty to raise the issue of prejudice
in its initial brief.

Harrington Trucking does not have the

duty to make appellee's arguments for her.

Appellee has now

raised the issued of prejudice and Harrington Trucking will
respond to the issue of prejudice.
POINT II.
BECAUSE THERE WAS AN ANSWER ON FILE, THE
TRIAL COURT'S ENTERING OF A DEFAULT
JUDGMENT WAS AB INITIO INVALID.
Appellee does not contest the fact that a responsive
pleading was on file on April 7, 1998.

Rather, appellee

attempts to characterize this pleading as not an answer.

In

support of her argument, appellee cites Black7s Law Dictionary
and a section from Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure claiming that Utah case law on what constitutes an
answer is "sparse".

However, there are several Utah cases

discussing the interpretation of pleadings generally and
answers specifically.
7

The general rule regarding interpretations of pleadings
like answers is embodied in Rule 8(f) of the Utah Rules of
Civil

Procedure

which

states,

"All

pleadings

shall

be

construed as to do substantial justice."
Pursuant to this general principle, a great deal of case
law has grown up around the proposition that pleadings like
answers should be liberally construed. As early as 1932, the
Utah Supreme Court held that an answer should be construed
liberally and supported by every legal intendment. Escalante
Co. v. Kent, 7 P. 2d 276 (Utah 1932) . The liberal construction
rule has also been applied to complaints.
889 P.2d

428

(Utah 1985),

the Supreme

In Debry v. Noble,
Court

held that

allegations in a complaint should be construed liberally.
This liberal construction rule is the bedrock upon which any
court should build its interpretation of an answer.
The answer filed by Harrington Trucking was in the form
of a general denial.

Harrington Trucking's answer filed on

April 7, 1998 states in pertinent part:

8

Comes now Harrington Trucking and
objects to the petition for judicial
declaration of common law marriage filed in
this matter by Janet Robbins Mitchell.
(R. 55-57.)
General denials of this form are specifically allowed by
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 8(b) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part:
A party shall state in short and plain
terms his defenses to each claim asserted
and shall admit or deny the averments upon
which they adverse party relies. ... He
may make his denials as specific denials of
designated averments or paragraphs or he
may generally deny all the averments.
(Emphasis added.)
In the case of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v.
Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1374 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme
Court discussed at length the rules applicable to general
denials.

The Supreme Court stated:
Under modern pleading rules, the scope
of a general denial is very broad. We held
in Cheney v. Rucker,
14 Utah 2d 2 05, 211,
381 P. 2d 86, 91 (1963) , and have reiterated
on numerous occasions since that although
rule 8(c) is valuable for assuring that the
issues to be tried clearly framed, it is
9

not the only rule in the book of Rules
of Civil Procedure. They must all be
looked to in light of their even more
fundamental purpose of liberalizing
both pleading and procedure to the end
that the parties are afforded the
privilege of presenting
whatever
legitimate
contentions
they have
pertaining to their dispute.
Thus our interpretation of the pleading
rules must turn upon the fact that u[w]hat
[the parties] are entitled to is notice of
the issues raised and an opportunity to
meet them."
When this is accomplished,
that is all that is required.
Therefore, the issue is whether the answer was adequate
to put appellee on notice of the parts of her petition which
would be contested by Harrington Trucking. The general denial
clearly indicates that all of appellee's contentions contained
in her petition may have been challenged by Harrington
Trucking.

This put appellee on notice that she needed to

prepare to prove all of her claims in her petition.
all that is required under the law.

10

That is

A. Even Assuming that the Objection is Construed as a
12(b) (6) Motion, the Trial Court Could Not Enter Default Under
the Rules; Therefore, Harrington Trucking's Motion to Set
Aside the Default Judgment Should Have Been Granted,
Appellee argues that the answer filed on April 7,1998
should be construed as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Therefore, she

reasons, the entry of default judgment was really a denial of
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Appellee then takes a final leap

beyond reason and states that default was properly entered.
This argument is without merit.

Appellee ignores the

requirement of proper notice and hearing on the alleged Rule
12(b)(6)

motion.

However,

even

ignoring

these

obvious

problems with appellee's arguments, the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure clearly indicated that even if the entry of default
judgment

were

a

denial

of

the

alleged

12(b)(6)

motion,

Harrington Trucking would have had ten days to file an answer.
Rule 12(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
If the court denies the motion or postpones
its disposition until the trial on the
merits, the responsive pleading shall be
served within ten days after notice of the
court's action.
(Emphasis added.)

11

In this case, the trial court entered default judgment on
October 28, 1998.

Even assuming that Harrington Trucking

received notice that same day, Harrington Trucking would have
ten days to file an answer.

Even appellee admits that

Harrington Trucking did in fact file an additional answer on
October 28, 1998, well within the ten-day required period to
file an answer following the denial of a motion to dismiss.
Therefore, under any set of circumstances

(either an

answer was on file, or the answer was really a 12(b) (6) motion
which was denied on October 28, 1998, followed by the filing
of a second answer on the same day), appellee's arguments fail
as a matter of law. Under either set of circumstances, there
was an appropriate answer on file.

Therefore, under Rule 55

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court could
not enter a default judgment.

Because the trial court could

not enter a default judgment, the trial court erred, as a
matter of law, by failing to set aside the default judgment at
a later date when given the opportunity to do so.

12

POINT III.
ANY PREJUDICE TO APPELLEE IN THIS CASE WAS
DUE TO APPELLEE'S DECISION TO FILE A
MERITLESS DEFAULT CERTIFICATE AND NOT TO
ANY ACTION OF HARRINGTON TRUCKING.
Appellee argues that she has been "prejudiced" by the
actions of Harrington Trucking.

However, it is not the

actions

which

of

Harrington

Trucking

have

caused

her

prejudice, if any, but rather her decision to pursue a
meritless default judgment.
On October 28, 1998, appellee was presented with a
choice.

She could either go ahead and have an evidentiary

hearing on her petition for common law marriage which was
scheduled to be heard on November 12, 1998, or she could
attempt to avoid a hearing on the merits by filing a default
certificate.

She knew or should have known that the latter

course would be risky in that a responsive pleading was on
file since April 7, 1998.

However, for reasons unknown,

appellee decided to gamble on the latter course instead of
having a trial on the merits.

13

It is unclear why appellee

wished to avoid a trial on the merits, but she attempted to
use a procedural argument to avoid a determination on the
merits.
If, in the end, her strategy results in damage to her
claim,

she can certainly not blame Harrington Trucking.

Harrington Trucking acted in good faith to complete discovery
in time for the evidentiary hearing. To now claim "prejudice"
due to her tactical decision is difficult to understand.
Appellee could have avoided this problem by simply going
forward with the evidentiary hearing. She choose not to do so
and instead chose a risky path. When a party harms its own
case by its own actions, it cannot claim prejudice due to
those actions.

See, Adams v. Board of Review of Industrial

Commission, 821 P. 2d 1, 7 (Utah App. 1991) (holding that when
considering an error that is strictly of one party's making,
the other party cannot be charged for that error); Askew v.
Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258, 1264

(Utah App. 1994) (dissenting

opinion) (when the dilemma is largely of one party's making,
the other party should not be charged with the error.)
14

Harrington Trucking is not responsible for appellee's poor
choices.
POINT IV.
WHETHER OR NOT AN ANSWER WAS FILED IS NOT
AN ISSUE OF FACT.
Although

appellee

contends

otherwise,

whether

the

pleading filed on April 7, 1998 is an answer is a question of
law, not of fact. Appellee concedes that there was a pleading
filed on April 7, 1998. The only issue, then, is whether said
pleading constitutes an answer.

Since the answer is part of

the record, this Court may determine for itself whether or not
it was filed on April 7th and the nature of the answer. There
is no issue of fact regarding this issue.
POINT V.
HARRINGTON TRUCKING CAN SEEK RELIEF UNDER
RULE 60(a).
Appellee argues that Harrington Trucking's request for
relief under Rule 60(a) is inappropriate because the issue is
not raised below.

However, appellee's argument ignores the

issue that was in fact raised below.
15

It

was

is

uncontroverted

that

Harrington

Trucking

requested the court to set aside the default judgment as there
was in fact an answer on file in the case.

Although counsel

for Harrington Trucking may have inadvertently termed the
relief requested as a motion to set aside default judgment
under Rule 60(b) (and in fact there was a request to set aside
the default judgment under the excusable neglect portion of
Rule 60(b)), the actual relief sought by Harrington was relief
under Rule 60(a) for a clerical mistake. Whether or not there
was an answer on file when default was entered is really a
clerical issue.

No matter how the counsel for Harrington

Trucking may have described his request, this Court will look
past the description of the motion and look to the substance
of the relief actually requested. In Brown v. David K.
Richards & Co, 978 P.2d at 470, 477-78 (Utah App. 1999), the
court stated:
In determining the nature of a legal
order or proceeding, we look to the
substance of the order or proceeding, and
not its title. See, e.g., Renn v. Utah
State

Bd.

of

Pardons,

16

904 P. 2d 677, 681

(Utah 1995) ("We will look to the substance
of the action and the nature of the relief
sought in determining the true nature of
the extraordinary relief requested.");
Gillmor
v. Wright,
850 P.2d 431,433 (Utah
1993) ("On appeal, we disregard the labels
attached to findings and conclusions and
look to substance.").
In this case, the relief actually requested was under
Rule 60(a).

The relief requested was briefed and argued,

therefore, it was raised below.

(R. 160-235.)

Furthermore, under Rule 60(a), the Appellate Court has
the ability to correct clerical mistakes.

Rule 60(a) states:

Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or
other parts of the record and errors
therein arising from oversight or omission
may be corrected by the court at any time
of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as
the court orders. During the pendency of
an appeal, such mistakes may be so
corrected before the appeal is docketed in
the appellate court, and thereafter while
the appeal is pending may be so corrected
with
leave
of
the
appellate
court.
(Emphasis added.)

17

Therefore, this Court has the power under Rule 60(a) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to correct the error which
occurred in this case, i.e., the entry of default judgment due
to the trial court's oversight in failing to recognize that an
answer had been filed.
POINT VI.
HARRINGTON TRUCKING HAS ESTABLISHED THAT IT
HAS A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE TO THIS ACTION.
Contrary to appellee's contentions, the trial court and
the Commissioner agreed that Harrington Trucking has adduced
evidence which gives it a meritorious defense to this action.
This evidence was discussed in the hearing before Judge
Maughan and in the briefs filed with the trial court.
235.)

(R.160-

Besides the documentary evidence which indicates that

the appellee did not have a marital relationship with Dennis
Mitchell as defined under Utah Code Annot., § 30-1-4.5, there
will be testimony, from some of the people whose affidavits
have been submitted in this case, that appellee's and Dennis

18

Mitchell's relationship was not a marital relationship as
defined under Utah Code Annot., § 30-1-4.5.
This is all that is necessary.

It is not for this Court

nor the lower court to weigh the evidence of these issues.
All that is necessary is that Harrington Trucking do what it
has done, i.e., present evidence that it has a meritorious
defense to this action.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, and for the reasons stated
in Harrington Trucking's prior brief, Harrington Trucking
respectfully requests this Court to reverse Judge Maughan's
decision to deny Harrington Trucking's motion to set aside
default judgment, set aside the default judgment and this
remand this case for further proceedings below consistent with
this Court's opinion.

19

DATED this

/£

day of October, 1999.
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